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Abstract—Such high-wattage demand-side appliances as Plug-
in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) are proliferating. As a result, informa-
tion on the charging patterns of PEVs is becoming accessible via
smartphone applications, which aggregate real-time availability
and historical usage of public PEV charging stations. Moreover,
information on the power grid infrastructure and operations
is available in white papers, technical documents, and real-
time dashboards of the utilities, affiliates, and the power grid
operators. The research question that this study explores is: Can
one combine high-wattage demand-side appliances with public
information to launch cyberattacks on the power grid? To answer
this question and report a proof of concept demonstration, the
study scrapes data from public sources for Manhattan, NY using
the electric vehicle charging station smartphone application and
the power grid data circulated by the US Energy Information
Administration, New York Independent System Operator, and
the local utility in New York City. It then designs a novel data-
driven cyberattack strategy using state-feedback based partial
eigenvalue relocation, which targets small-signal stability of the
power grid. The study establishes that while such an attack is
not possible at the current penetration level of PEVs, it will be
practical once the number of PEVs increases.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, electric vehicles, electric vehicles
charging stations, public information.
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER grid is vulnerable to attacks on its cyber in-frastructure because they allow an attacker to remotely
manipulate various physical assets (e.g., generation, transmis-
sion, distribution, and substation equipment). For example, the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
of the Ukraine power grid was compromised by the BlackEn-
ergy3 trojan, which launches a Distributed Denial-of-service
(DDoS), espionage, and information erasure attack, [1]. First,
the attackers sent spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word
and Excel documents infected with the BlackEnergy3 trojan
to the employees of the Ukraine power grid company. Second,
when these attachments were opened, the trojan self-installed
and automatically discovered authentication credentials of
the SCADA computers. Third, the discovered authentication
credentials were used to create a virtual private network
channel to remotely access the human-machine interface of
the SCADA system and open circuit breakers, which led to
power supply disruptions for over 225,000 end-users [2]. To
prevent such attacks, power grid operators attempt to isolate
the SCADA network from external interfaces and public
networks [3]. Even if successful, this isolation cannot cope
with demand-side cyberattacks that compromise and exploit
residential and commercial high-wattage appliances. These
appliances are not directly observed by power grid operators
and are vulnerable to cyberattacks due to the poor security
hygiene of end-users [4] or backdoors in their complex supply
chains, involving foreign manufacturers [5].
Demand-side cyberattacks are possible because many high-
wattage appliances have communication and control interfaces
forming an Internet of Things (IoT). Although such power grid
attacks have not been executed in practice, similar attacks
have been observed in other sectors. For instance, consider
the Mirai malware that infected over 600,000 IoT devices
[6]. The Mirai malware identified and accessed IoT devices
with factory-set default authentication credentials and formed
a network of bots (botnet). This botnet was used to launch a
massive DDoS cyberattack on the Dyn Domain Name Service
provider. The attack caused hours-long service disruptions to
such web-services as Airbnb, PayPal, and Twitter [6]. As a
result of this attack, Dyn lost roughly 8% of its customers [7].
Recent studies [8]–[10] model generic demand-side cyber-
attacks on the power grid. Soltan et al. [8] demonstrated that
the IoT-controlled Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning
(HVAC) loads can cause generator and line failures, leading
to local outages and system-wide blackouts, even if a small
fraction of all loads is compromised (e.g., 4 bots per 1 MW
of demand, where 1 bot is considered as 1 IoT-controlled
HVAC unit). Additionally, results in [8] illustrated that the
compromised loads can increase the operating cost (e.g., 50
bots per 1 MW demand can increase the power grid operating
cost by 20%). Amini et al. [9] used load-altering demand-side
attacks to cause power grid frequency instability over multiple
periods aided by real-time frequency feedback. As [9] shows,
multi-period attacks require a smaller number of compromised
loads, relative to the single-period attacks [9]. Dvorkin and
Garg [10] demonstrated propagation of demand-side cyber
attacks from the distribution network to the transmission
network, which scales attack impacts across large geographical
areas. However, [8]–[10] consider generic appliances and do
not consider specific attack vectors caused by a particular high-
wattage, IoT-enabled appliance. Furthermore, these studies use
generic power grid test beds customized for the needs of
their case studies. These assumptions lead to a conservative
assessment of impacts that demand-side cyberattacks have
on the power grid, which can be launched by a perfectly
omniscient attacker. In practice, the attacker has limited knowl-
edge of the power grid and the compromised loads, which
reduces the attack severity. This paper aims to avoid unrealistic
generalizations on the attack vector and, therefore, collects and
exploits publicly accessible power grid and electric vehicle
charging station (EVCS) demand data.
Our review shows that charging patterns of high-wattage
Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) in public EVCSs are reported
through smartphone applications (e.g., ChargePoint). Although
attempts were made to develop cyber hygiene requirements
and protocols for PEVs charging (e.g., the 2017 report by
European Network for Cyber Security [11]), there is no estab-
lished consensus among manufacturers, consumer advocates,
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2utilities, as well as national and international authorities. For
instance, power utilities in New York proposed a cybersecurity
protocol, which was subsequently denied by the third-party
service providers due to its engineering and cost implications
[12]. Most of the utilities still treat PEVs and EVCSs as
passive loads and do not pro-actively monitor their usage and
cyber hygiene. As a result, the cybersecurity community warns
that PEVs and EVCSs can evolve as an attack vector into
the power grid. For instance, Kaspersky Lab revealed security
flaws in the ChargePoint Home charger and its smartphone
application [13]. This flaw would enable an attacker to re-
motely control PEV charging after gaining access to a Wi-Fi
network1 to which the charger is connected. Fraiji et al. [15],
Ahmed et al. [16], and Pratt and Carroll [17] discuss cyber
vulnerabilities of communication interfaces of IoT-controlled
PEVs and EVCSs. The vulnerabilities in [13], [15]–[17] are
considered from the viewpoint of an attack damaging either
PEVs or EVCSs. However, threats imposed on the power grid
from such vulnerabilities are not assessed.
This paper aims to demonstrate that public information on
EVCS demand and power grids is a cyber threat to the urban
power grid with a large PEV fleet. The study appraises the risk
of realistic rather than omniscient attack assumptions by only
using public data to represent EVCS demand and power grid
operations to design the attack. First, the study outlines how
an attacker can collect data on PEVs and the power grid using
public sources from Manhattan, NY as an example. Second,
using this data the study designs a novel data-driven attack
strategy that manipulates PEV and EVCS loads to induce
frequency instability in the power grid. The novelty of this
data-driven strategy is that it uses the state-feedback based
partial eigenvalue relocation using the Bass-Gura approach,
which makes it possible to relocate some eigenvalues to the
location chosen by the attacker and to minimize the amount of
the compromised EVCS demand needed for the attack. Unlike
real-time frequency measurement and feedback in prior attack
designs, e.g., as in [9], the attack strategy in this work does
not require real-time monitoring of the state of the power grid,
i.e., can be carried out remotely, and is robust to the ambiguity
in estimating the EVCS demand.
Given these public data and data-driven attack strategy, this
paper evaluates the vulnerability of power grids to unsophisti-
cated attack mechanisms that can be executed by malicious
actors with moderate preparation and limited or even no
access to power grid’s cyber infrastructure. Such dilettante
vulnerability assessments are not common in power grid se-
curity analyses, which typically employ the worst-case attack
assumption, but common in other disciplines. For example,
the N th Country Experiment carried out by the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in 1960-s aimed to assess the
ability of non-military personnel to design a military-grade
nuclear explosive device using publicly available publications
and materials. The team of three physicists managed to design
such a device (‘dirty bomb’) within 2 years, which had long-
term implications for nuclear nonproliferation [18]. Similarly,
we anticipate that this paper will raise awareness about the
1For instance, bruteforcing is the most used method to hack passwords [14].
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Fig. 1. Cyber-physical interfaces among the power grid, EVCSs, and PEVs,
as well as sources of public EVCSs data.
simplicity of designing and executing data-driven, demand-
side cyber attacks and facilitate negotiating a common cyber-
security protocol [12], for grid-end appliances.
II. PUBLIC EVCS AND POWER GRID DATA
This section describes cyber-physical interfaces among the
power grid, EVCSs, and PEVs and details a procedure to
collect public data that the attacker can use to plan and launch
an attack. Since the borough of Manhattan, NY has the greatest
penetration rate of PEVs in the state of New York [19], we
considered this area to demonstrate the attack concept.
A. Interdependence between the Power Grid and PEVs
Fig. 1 shows the cyber and physical links between the power
grid, the EVCSs, and the PEVs. An EVCS is pivotal to the
cyber-physical interdependency between the power grid and
PEVs. The attacker can observe some of these interdependen-
cies using web-services of the EVCS vendors and the third-
parties like ChargePoint that aggregate EVCS and PEV data.
There are three EVCS levels adopted by vendors and related
organizations: Level 1 (L1), Level 2 (L2), and Level 3 (L3).
They vary in their power capacity, voltage, and current ratings
[20]. The L1 EVCS are wall outlets in a residential single-
phase AC system rated at 120 V, 12-16 A, and deliver
1.44-1.9 kW power to the PEVs from the grid. Since L1
chargers are typically installed in homes, their data is not
generally available to the public. The L2 and L3 chargers
are in commercial charging stations that can host multiple
PEVs. The L2 EVCS uses single or split-phase AC system
with 208-240 V, 15-80 A, and delivers 3.1-19.2 kW power to
PEVs from the grid. The L2 EVCS charges PEVs faster than
the L1 EVCS. The L3 EVCS is the most high-wattage PEV
charger and, therefore, induce a greater volatility to power grid
operations. These superchargers are DC systems with 300-600
V, up to 400 A, and deliver 25-350 kW to each PEV. A wired
communication channel between an EVCS and a PEV is used
for transmitting the signal to condition and control the PEV
charging. EVCSs and PEVs also have wireless channels that
routes to smartphone applications and public web-sites.
3B. Acquisition of Publicly Accessible Data
1) EVCS Data: To acquire publicly available granular
information on the physical location, electrical characteristics,
historical and real-time usage of EVCSs, we use the Charge-
Point smartphone application. This application aggregates 319
L2 and L3 EVCSs operated by different companies across
Manhattan, NY, as of March 2019, as shown in Fig. 2. Also,
Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC) provides information
about the location and business hours of EVCSs located in the
US and Canada [21]. Cross-verifying the information provided
by ChargePoint and AFDC, we obtained information about lo-
cations, physical characteristics, real-time and historical hourly
usage profile of EVCSs as summarized in Fig. 3. Each L2
charger in Fig. 3 has a power rating of 6.6 kW, while the
power ratings of L3 chargers are 25 and 72 kW (72 kW for
Tesla superchargers). Fig. 4 displays the total average hourly
power consumed by the EVCS of each type and their standard
deviation.
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Fig. 2. Number of public L2 and L3 EVCSs and their outlets (in logarithmic
scale) for different EVCS companies in Manhattan, NY as of March 2019.
TABLE I
COLLECTING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE POWER GRID DATA.
Information Details Resources
Network
Configuration
Location,
capacity
generators
(MVA, kV),
transmission
lines (kV),
substations (kV)
Documents from utilities, af-
filiates, organizations, research
and development projects [22],
[23].
Transformer,
line
parameters
MVA,
Impedance,
X/R ratio
MVA*, IEEE test standards, ref-
erence designs [24], [25].
Generator pa-
rameters
Moment of iner-
tia, damping co-
efficients
IEEE test standards, reference
designs, catalogues from utili-
ties/manufacturers [24], [25].
Generator
controller
parameters
Controller type
and parameters
Manual estimation from white
papers.
Load parame-
ters
Base and
manipulatable
loads, load
damping constant
Real-time loads and historical
profiles published by operator;
Manipulatable loads described
in Section II-B1; Damping
constant:1-2% [26].
* Estimated from generation, demand and flows associated
with the substation.
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Fig. 3. Topology of the power grid and locations of public EVCSs in
Manhattan, NY as of March 2019. The power grid configuration includes
transmission lines (138 kV and 345 kV), substations and power plants. The
size of the blue circles is proportional to the EVCS demand.
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Fig. 4. Average hourly power consumed by public EVCSs and their standard
deviation over a week in Manhattan, NY.
2) Power grid data: Unlike the EVCS data, which is
available via third parties and dedicated aggregators, power
grid data is fragmented. Therefore, an attacker has to manually
review a vast number of documents from multiple public
sources to reconstruct the grid topology and model the physical
and electrical characteristics of the components. In addition to
the high-level locational information about power grids avail-
able through Geographical Information System (e.g., Google
Maps), one can refine this representation of the network using
publicly reported updates on individual projects performed
by the power utilities, which provide information about the
locations of substations, transmission lines and power plants,
and specific parameters (e.g., power and voltage ratings of
lines and substations and historical and real-time behavior
of generation and demand) [22], [23]. Compiling and using
this information, we were able to reconstruct a 345 kV and
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Fig. 5. An electrical diagram of the power grid in Fig. 3. Only transmission
lines that are within Manhattan, NY and those, which directly supply power
to Manhattan are considered. The line lengths are estimated via Google Maps.
138 kV transmission network configuration with substation
transformers, lines, power plants, and a high-level aggregation
of nodal demand in Manhattan, NY. This information is shown
atop EVCS location map in Fig. 3. The remaining power
grid parameters that the attacker needs to launch a demand-
side attack are not readily available, but can be inferred from
mandatory IEEE and IEC standards.
Using the representation in Fig. 3, we design an electric
circuit equivalent given in Fig. 5, suitable for grid stability
analysis. Table I summarizes the sources of power grid data
and methods to obtain the grid parameters. The only large
power plant (nominal capacity of 716 MW) is in node B5.
We model other substations as either generators or loads based
on their power injection (e.g., tie lines) or consumption. The
demand data for the New York City is reported by New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO). We itemize this de-
mand for each node in Fig. 5 using load distribution from [27].
The power flows in tie-lines connecting the Manhattan network
to the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnec-
tion and to the rest of the NYISO system are learned from
the values released in the real-time dashboard of the system
operators and the utilities [28]. Impedance of the underground
transmission line cables are computed using Carsons equations
[29] and the cable parameters in [30]. We approximated the
voltage ratio of substation transformers based on the voltage
level of the cables and the generating stations. Similarly, MVA-
ratings of substations are approximated based on the associated
generation and load. We approximated other parameters such
as the transformer impedance ratio and the moment of inertia
of the power plant using data sheets for equipment with
comparable parameters [24], [25].
III. POWER GRID MODEL
Assuming that the attacker has the publicly accessible
EVCS and the power grid data from Section II, designing
an attack strategy requires a power grid model that relates the
data with the physics of the power grid operation. Malicious
load alterations are anticipated to be small, relative to the
total system demand, and swift so as not to alarm the system
operator. The impact of these small disturbances on the power
grid stability can be analyzed using the small-signal stability
theory [26]. The core assumption that underlies this theory
is that small disturbances and the dynamic behavior of the
power grid can be accurately modeled by linear power flow
equations (e.g., DC approximation) and by first-order ordinary
differential equations (e.g., swing equation). Taken together,
the data collected and the small-signal power grid model allow
the attacker to seek a data-driven, load-altering action that
would cause frequency instability in power grids.
A. Model
We consider a power grid with N nodes with mutually
exclusive subsets2 of generator nodes G ⊆ N and load nodes
L ⊆ N . Let N = card(N ) be the number of nodes such
that N = 1 + G + L, which includes one slack (reference)
bus, G = card(G), and L = card(L). Let δi and θj be the
elements of vectors of nodal voltage angles at generator node
i ∈ G and at load node j ∈ L, respectively. The nominal
(synchronous) angular speed ωs = 2pifs, where fs = 60 Hz.
Using the DC power flow approximation, we model the
nodal power balance for generator and load nodes as:
PGi =
∑
k∈B
Yik∆δi, ∀i ∈ G, (1a)
PLj =−
∑
k∈B
Yjk∆θj , ∀j ∈ L, (1b)
where Yik and Yjk are the imaginary parts of the complex
admittance between nodes i and k and nodes j and k,
respectively. Further, ∆δi and ∆δj in Eq. (1) are defined as:
∆δi =
{
δi − δk, ∀i ∈ G, ∀k ∈ G,
δi − θk, ∀i ∈ G, ∀k ∈ L,
(1c)
∆θj =
{
θj − δk, ∀j ∈ L, ∀k ∈ G,
θj − θk, ∀j ∈ L, ∀k ∈ L.
(1d)
In addition to the DC power flow model in Eq. (1), we
model the dynamic behavior of the power grid using the swing
equation for every generator node i ∈ G:
Miω˙i = P
M
i − PGi −DGi ωi, (2a)
δ˙i = ωi, (2b)
where Mi and DGi are the moment of inertia and damping
coefficient of the generator at node i, ωi is the angular speed
difference between the speed of the rotor of the generator at
node i and the synchronous speed (ωs). PGi is the electrical
power output and PMi is the mechanical power output of its
turbine driving the generator at node i.
The balance between PG =
∑
i∈G P
G
i and P
L =∑
j∈L P
L
j determines the frequency stability of the power grid.
The conventional controllable generators are set to maintain
PG ≈ PL by adjusting PMi using in-feed of ωi in real-
time. This control is implemented using primary speed-droop
(proportional) and secondary (integral) controls as:
PMi = −
(
KPi ωi +K
I
i
∫ T
0
ωi
)
, (2c)
where KPi and K
I
i are pre-defined proportional and integral
gain parameters, respectively, and the negative sign on the
right-hand side of Eq. (2c) indicates that PMi is adjusted in
2If a node hosts both the generator and load it can be split into two nodes.
5the opposite direction to changes in ωi. The value of KPi is
set to reduce instant frequency excursions and the value of KI
is set to reduce frequency volatility over the time period T .
Using the DC power flow in Eq. (1) and the dynamic
model of generator in Eq. (2), we can model the power grid
dynamics under small disturbances. We use PMi from Eq. (2c)
and PGi from Eq. (1a) into Eq. (2a) to obtain the resulting
dynamics of generator nodes i ∈ G in Eq. (3a). Similarly, for
each load node j ∈ L, we split nodal power in Eq. (1b) to
formulate Eq. (3b), where P
L
j is the nodal load unaffected
by the attacker, ∆PLj is the load altered by the attacker, and
DLi is the damping coefficient. Thus, the system of equations
representing the power grid dynamics is:
Miω˙i =−
(
KPi −DGi
)
ωi−KIδi−
∑
k∈B
Yik∆δi,∀i ∈ G, (3a)
0 = P
L
j −DLj θj + ∆PLj +
∑
k∈B
Yjk∆θi,∀j ∈ L, (3b)
δ˙i = ωi, ∀i ∈ G. (3c)
The model in Eq. (3) can be built by the attacker using
public data described in Section II. The manipulated EVCS
demand data is accounted by parameter ∆PLi , while power
grid parameters Mi,KPi ,K
I
i , D
G
i , D
L
i , Yik, and Yjk can be
obtained using sources summarized in Table I. The dynamic
model of the power grid in Eq. (3) can be represented as a
linear state-space descriptor system:
Ex˙ = Aˆx+ Bˆu, (4a)
with the descriptor matrix E ∈ R(2G+L)×(2G+L), state matix
Aˆ ∈ R(2G+L)×(2G+L), control vector Bˆ ∈ R(2G+L)×1 and
state variable vector x ∈ R(2G+L)×1, as well as scalar input
u ∈ R. The descriptor system in Eq. (4a) is regularized as:
x˙ = Ax+Bu, (4b)
where A = E−1Aˆ and B = E−1Bˆ. In terms of Eq. (3), state
vector x and control input vector u are defined as:
x = [δ, ω, θ]T (4c)
uj = ∆P
L
j + P
L
j , (4d)
where δ ∈ RG×1, ω ∈ RG×1, θ ∈ RL×1, j is the attack
launching node. In turn, matrices A and B are defined as:
A =
E−1︷ ︸︸ ︷I 0 00 −M 0
0 0 DL
−1
Aˆ︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0 I 0KI+YGG KP +DG YGL
YLG 0 YLL
 (4e)
B =
I 0 00 −M 0
0 0 DL
−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E−1
00
Iˆ

︸︷︷︸
Bˆ
, (4f)
where YGG ∈ RG×G, YGL ∈ RG×L, YLG ∈ RL×G
and YLL ∈ RL×L are submatrices of admittance matrix
Y = [YGG YGL;YLG YLL]. M ∈ RG×G, DG ∈ RG×G,
KP ∈ RG×G, KI ∈ RG×G, and DL ∈ RL×L are the diagonal
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Fig. 6. Schematic representation of the demand-side cyberattack, where an
attacker calculates the amount of compromised loads by adjusting Ka.
submatrices and IG×G is an identity matrix. Vector Iˆ ∈ RL×1
has all elements set to zero except the nodes where the attack
is launched, i.e., ∆PLj 6= 0. Using the system in Eq. (4b),
the power grid stability can be evaluated using eigenvalues
of state matrix A. The attacker can use Eq. (4b) to estimate
the eigenvalues of A without malicious load alterations, i.e.,
∆PL = 0, and use this information to seek ∆PL 6= 0 that
modifies eigenvalues to cause instability.
B. Data-driven Demand-Side Cyberattack
1) Data-Driven Attack Mechanism: To design the attack,
we consider u = P
L
+ ∆PL = P
L − Kax, where Ka ∈
R1×2G+L is the vector of gains set by the attacker to modify
the power consumption of the compromised loads. Hence, the
system in Eq. (4b) is recast as follows:
x˙ = Ax+B(P
L −Kax) = (A−BKa)x+BPL, (5a)
which corresponds to the state-feedback based control diagram
in Fig. 6. The stability of the system in Eq. (5a) is determined
by eigenvalues of matrix (A − BKa) and, thus, can be
influenced by the attacker by strategically selecting the values
of Ka. In turn, the attacker is limited in their ability to
select the value of Ka by the EVCS demand available for
manipulations:
0 ≤ Kax ≤ ∆Pmax, (5b)
where ∆Pmax is the capacity of compromised EVCS loads.
The attack shown in Fig. 6 is different from the attack
in [8]–[10]. Particularly, the attack does not use real-time
frequency feedback as in [9] and the attack is constrained
by the real-life data available to the attacker as opposed to
generalization of attack vector data in [8]–[10]. The attack in
Eq. (5) simplifies implementation as the attacker does not need
to observe the power grid in real-time. From the perspective of
the attacker, Eq. (5) is constrained by the availability of data
and the capacity of the compromised EVCSs demand ∆Pmax.
Even if the parameters in the power grid model change over
time, i.e., it affects matrix A, and, thus, power grid stability, the
attacker can be informed of this change via a public disclosure
process of power utilities (e.g., announcement about outages,
maintenance, planned asset retirement/installations, upgrades,
real-time generation and demand schedules).
62) Data-Driven Attack Optimization: Although the attacker
can modify the eigenvalues of the power grid model to cause
instability [9], this relocation might be tracked by the grid
operator. Thus, the relocation must be carried out in such a way
that load alterations are kept at minimum. The attacker will
aim to minimize Ka to avoid being detected. Since the value of
Ka should be large enough to cause instability (e.g., to make
the real part of at least one eigenvalue greater than or equal to
zero), the attacker faces an optimization problem of selecting
the least-possible value of Ka that ensures instability. To do
this, we use the Bass-Gura approach for the state-feedback-
based partial eigenvalue placement [31].
Let o(s) and p(s) be the monic characteristic equations of
the original (pre-attack) and compromised power grid models
in Eqs. (4b) and (5a), respectively. We obtain the eigenvalues
by solving:
o(s)= |sI−A| = sn+on−1sn−1+. . .+o0s0 = 0, (6)
p(s)= |sI−A+BKa|=sn+pn−1sn−1+. . .+p0s0=0, (7)
where n = 2G+L is the order of the system and eo ∈ Cn×1
and ep ∈ Cn×1 are eigenvectors for Eqs. (6)-(7). We assume
that the original power grid model is stable, i.e., Re(eo) < 0.
Adjusting Ka the attacker modifies eigenvalues in eo such that
some eigenvalues in ep become real positive. Using the state-
feedback based controller design procedure presented in [31],
[32], the relationship between the coefficients of Eq. (6) and
those of Eq. (7) in terms of Ka is:
p− o = WMTc Ka, (8)
where p = [p0 p1 . . . pn−1] and o = [o0 o1 . . . on−1]
are vectors of coefficients of the characteristic equations,
W ∈ Rn×n is a Hankel matrix with its first column set to
[o1 o2 . . . on−1 1] and elements below the anti-diagonal are
zero, and Mc ∈ Rn×n is a controllability matrix defined as:
Mc = [B AB . . . A
n−1B], (9)
where rank(Mc) defines the maximum number of eigenvalues
that can be relocated. Since matrix Mc is composed of
matrices A and B, its rank and the number of eigenvalues
that can be relocated depends on parameters M , DG, Y , KP ,
KI , and DL, which can be learned by the attacker using
public sources. Recasting p(s) in Eq. (7) in the decomposed
polynomial form in terms of eigenvalues leads to [32]:
p(s) =
m∏
i=1
(s+ eai )︸ ︷︷ ︸
a(s)
n−m∏
j=1
(s+ erj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r(s)
, (10)
where m is the number of eigenvalues that the attacker
attempts to relocate, ea ⊆ ep is the vector of eigenvalues
relocated by the attacker and er ⊆ ep is the vector of the
remaining eigenvalues. Vectors a = [a0 a1 . . . am−1] and
r = [r0 r1 . . . rn−m−1] are coefficients of monic polynomials
formed by ea and er, respectively. Given ea, we use Eqs. (8)–
(10) to compute r [32]:
r = FWMTc K
a + g, (11)
where F ∈ Cn−m+1×n and g ∈ Cn−m+1×1 are the auxiliary
matrix and vector defined as in Eqs. (12a)–(12f) below. Indeed,
since the matrices Mc and W are derived from matrices A and
B, the auxiliary terms are parameterized as:
F (i, 1) =
i−1∑
k=1
F (i− k, 1)−ak
a0
, ∀i = 2 . . . n−m, (12a)
F (1, 1) =
1
a0
, F (1, j) = 0, ∀j = 2 . . . n, (12b)
F (i, j) = F (i− 1, j − 1), ∀i = 2 . . . n−m,∀j = 2 . . .m,
(12c)
F (n−m+ 1, j) = 0, ∀j = 2 . . .m, (12d)
g(i) =
i−1∑
k=1
(g(i− k)−ak
a0
) +
oi−1
a0
, ∀i = 2 . . . n−m,
(12e)
g(1) =
o0
a0
, g(n−m+ 1) = 1. (12f)
Back substituting r(s) in Eq. (10) yields m linearly indepen-
dent equations that can be expressed as follows:
VWMTc K
a + h = 0, (13)
where matrix V ∈ Cm×n and vector h ∈ Cm×1, which assures
ea ⊆ ep as desired by the attacker assuming full state-feedback
controllability of the model in Eq. (5a). Since Eq. (13) governs
the eigenvalue relocation, the attacker can use the following
optimization problem to select the least possible value of Ka:
min
Ka∈Rn
||Ka||2 (14a)
VWMTc K
a + h = 0, (14b)
0 ≤ |Kax| ≤ ∆PLmax. (14c)
3) Parameter Uncertainty in the Data-Driven Attack: To
account for the likelihood of erroneous data, the attacker may
robustify the data-driven attack optimized in Eq. (14) against
inaccuracies of the model parameters it learns. Randomness
in ∆PLmax can be modeled as ∆PL() = ∆PLmax + ,
where  is the model parameter uncertainty or inaccuracy (e.g.,
Gaussian noise). Thus, Eq. (14c) is replaced with the following
probabilistic constraint:
P
(
∆PL() ≥ |Kax|) ≥ 1− η, (15)
where η is a small number chosen by the attacker based on
their confidence in the data. Eq. (15) can be reformulated as
a second-order conic constraint [33]:
∆PLmax − α ≥ Kax ≤ ∆PLmax + α, (16a)
where α = φ−1(1 − η)Stdev() is an error margin on esti-
mating ∆PLmax and φ−1 is an inverse cumulative distribution
function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
IV. CASE STUDY
We evaluate the feasibility of the data-driven attack devel-
oped above using the EVCS demand and power grid data
illustrated in Fig. 3. The expected value and standard deviation
of the EVCS demand is used as in Fig. 4 with η = 0.0005. We
7set node B7, connecting Manhattan, NY with New Jersey (see
Fig. 3), as the reference node with an infinite power source
since it is the largest power supplier to Manhattan, NY. The
base power is 100 MVA and the rated system frequency is 60
Hz. The values of state vector x in the optimization problem in
Eq. (14) are conservatively obtained by solving Eq. (4b) for
normal operating conditions. The case study uses the open-
source CVX package run under MATLAB and is carried out
on a MacBook Air with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and
8 GB RAM. The optimization in Eq. (14) is convex and, hence,
does not pose a computational challenge, even if applied to
larger networks than in Fig. 3. All instances below were solved
under tens of seconds.
A. Ability of the Attacker to Relocate Eigenvalues
The objective of this subsection is to demonstrate that the
attacker can leverage the optimization in Eq. (14) to move
eigenvalues of the pre-attack system to pre-determined loca-
tions in the real-positive plane, thus causing system instability.
The power grid in Fig. 5 has 4 generation nodes (including
reference node B7) represented by (ωi, δi), and 4 load nodes
represented by θj . Thus, state vector x has 12 entries (2 entries
per generation node and 1 entry per load node) and the pre-
attack power grid modeled by Eq. (4b) has 12 eigenvalues. We
select node B4 to attack because it has the greatest demand.
Using Eq. (9), we compute controllability matrix Mc and find
that rank(Mc) = 2, which means that the attacker can attempt
to move up to 2 eigenvalues. Since the objective of the attacker
is to move these eigenvalues to the real-positive plane to
destabilize the power grid, the target eigenvalue locations are
arbitrarily set to ea = a± jb = 0.5± j5 for the demonstration
as shown in Fig. 7. These eigenvalues corresponds to the
damping ratio ξ = −10% and the natural oscillation frequency
ωn = 5 rad/s (since a = −ξωn and b = ωn
√
1− ξ2
[26]). Upon relocating 2 eigenvalues to the target locations
in the real-positive plane, 2 out of 12 state variables will
oscillate following the attack with angular frequency ωn and
an increasing amplitude (due to negative damping−ξ), causing
power grid instability.
Under the attack scenario described above, the current
maximum EVCS demand given by the maximum daily peak
of ≈600 kW and standard deviation of 211 kW (both are
observed at 14:00, see Fig. 4) is not sufficient to relocate
any eigenvalue to the target locations and, therefore, Eq. (14)
yields an infeasible solution. Therefore, the EVCS demand at
node B4 is scaled up to the maximum daily peak of 355 MW3
and standard deviation of 124 MW to simulate a higher PEV
penetration case. In this case, two eigenvalues are moved into
the real-positive plane as shown in Fig. 7, which causes power
grid instability targeted by the attacker.
B. Minimum EVCS Demand to Destabilize the Power Grid
In the previous subsection, we demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed data-driven attack for the case with a relatively
high, but foreseeable penetration rate of PEVs. However,
3Equivalent to ≈2,900 Model S Teslas simultaneously charged by 120 kW
superchargers. The number reduces to ≈1000 PEVs, if 350 kW Ionity high-
power chargers are used instead.
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Fig. 7. Relocation of the eigenvalues under attack on node B4, where eo
denotes original (pre-attack) eigenvalues and ea denotes eigenvalue locations
targeted by the attacker. The post-attack eigenvalues are denoted as ep. Green
lines represent ξ and ωn and the gray shaded area represents Sa.
this demonstration used arbitrarily chosen target eigenvalue
locations. In practice, it is anticipated that such a relocation
of eigenvalues can be detected by the power grid operator
and, therefore, the attacker is likely to mask its intention and
relocate eigenvalues surreptitiously. Under this scenario, the
attacker may elect to move eigenvalues to a so-called region of
vulnerability, where endogenous disturbances natural to power
grid operations can cause power grid instability. The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation defines the region
of vulnerability as, [34]:
Sa ∈ C : {ξ ≤ 3%, 2.5 ≤ ωn ≥ 12.6 rad/s}. (17)
Using the region of vulnerability in Eq. (17), we will compute
the minimum EVCS demand that the attacker needs to com-
promise to move 2 eigenvalues into that region of vulnerability.
We discretize Sa using a resolution of 0.3% and 0.1 rad/s
intervals for ξ and ωn, respectively, and obtain the discrete
space Sˆa. For each pair {ξˆ, ωˆn} ∈ Sˆa, we compute target
eigenvalues as eˆa = aˆ ± jbˆ, where aˆ = −ξˆωˆn and bˆ =
ωˆn
√
1− ξˆ2. In addition to the selection of target eigenvalues
eˆa that the attacker seeks to achieve, the amount of EVCS
loads that the attacker needs to compromise in order to launch
an attack depends on pre-attack eigenvalues eo and rank(Mc).
Since rank(Mc) < card(x), the attacker can directly impact4
only some state variables in x. As a result, the attacker cannot
always relocate eigenvalues to the chosen target locations
precisely. Therefore, for each pair {ξˆ, ωˆn} ∈ Sˆa, we obtain
the value of Kˆa using the optimization in Eq. (14) and obtain
the minimum EVCS load (∆PˆL = Kˆax) that needs to be
compromised to destabilize the power grid. To assess how
precisely the attacker managed to relocate eigenvalues to the
target locations, we use distance metric ε = ||e˜p− eˆa||2, where
4The state variables directly impacted by the attack can be inferred using
the participation factor [26], which defines relationships between eigenvalues
eo and state variables x, and relative locations of eo and ep. For instance,
the attack in Fig. 7 moved eo = −9.6± j0.0037 to ea = 0.5± j5, which
directly impacts state variable δ of nodes B4 and B7, and state variable θ of
nodes B4 and B5, while the remaining state variables in x are barely affected.
8Fig. 8. Maximum relocation error ε = ||e˜p − eˆa||2 for different {ξˆ, ωˆn} ∈
Sˆa chosen by the attacker, where e˜p are the two nearest eigenvalues to eˆa.
TABLE II
∆PˆL NEEDED TO MOVE EIGENVALUES WITH THE RELOCATION ERROR
OF ε ≤ 0.1 (MW)
ωn(rad/s)
ξ
-0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0 0.03
5.7 377 372.3 367.6 362.7 357.8
10.7 298.4 291.2 N/A* N/A* N/A*
11.3 290.2 283.3 276.4 269.5 262.6
11.9 282.5 276 269.6 263.2 256.7
12.6 275.2 269.1 263.1 257.1 251.2
* The value corresponds to ε > 0.1 and labeled not available (N/A)
e˜p ⊆ ep is the vector of the 2 nearest eigenvalues to eˆa. This
distance serves as a measure of remoteness between the actual
position of the 2 nearest and target eigenvalues locations.
Fig. 8 illustrates the ability of the attacker to relocate
eigenvalues to the target locations precisely. The relocation
accuracy improves, i.e., the value of ε → 0, as the values of
ωˆn ∈ Sˆa and ξˆ ∈ Sˆa increase. However, the value of ε is more
sensitive to ωˆn than to ξˆ. The attack scenarios that use pairs
{ξˆ, ωˆn} ∈ Sˆa with a relatively high accuracy of relocation
(e.g., ε < 0.1, see Fig. 8) are used to compute ∆PˆL = Kˆax
and are summarized in Table II. As the value of ξ and ωn
increase, the minimum EVCS load required to launch an attack
from node B4 reduces. In other words, the amount of EVCS
loads needed to be compromised increases with the severity
of instabilities, i.e., higher oscillations and negative damping
of the time-domain response of state variables x.
This analysis assumes that the data-driven attack is launched
from node B4. If this case study is carried out for other nodes,
the severity of the attack reduces. For example, if the attack is
launched by nodes B3, B5, and B6, it will not destabilize the
power grid as their load is not enough to move the eigenvalues,
with smaller amount of ε, into the region of vulnerability.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper unveils a demand-side cyberattack that can
imperil the power grid operations using PEVs and EVCS
infrastructure. The attack uses publicly available EVCS and
power grid data to design a data-driven attack strategy that is
capable of destabilizing the power grid using partial eigen-
value relocation. Using data-driven optimization, we study
the impact of this attack on the power grid of Manhattan,
NY. Even though the current PEV penetration does not seem
feasible to hamper the power grid stability, it highlights an
emerging vulnerability as more PEVs are rolled out, which
drives the need for high-capacity EVCSs and leads to more
PEVs charged simultaneously.REFERENCES
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